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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED N. HOBSON, et ux, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs-
PANGUITCH LAKE 
CORPORATION, et al, 
Defendants, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs -
DERRAL CHRISTENSEN, et ux 
and etal, 
Third-Party Defendants, Fourth-Party 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs-




STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Plaintiffs/Respondents sue to quiet title in a 
parcel of real property in the possession of Defendant/ 
Appellant who counterclaims against Plaintiffs seeking 
to quiet title to the disputed property in it. 
Defendant/Appellant also filed a Third Party Com-
plaint against Third Party Defendants for damages for 
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property to it and for attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in defending title to the property. Third Party Defendants 
filed a Fourth Party Complaint against Fourth Party De-
fendant/Respondent for breach of covenants contained in 
a Warranty Deed to them and seeking the same relief as 
that claimed against them. 
Hereafter the parties will be referred to as they ap-
pear in the District Court. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found in favor of the Plaintiffs 
and held that there had been an oral agreement between 
Plaintiffs and William Marsden, the husband of the 
Fourth Party Defendant, establishing the boundary line to 
the disputed property. 
The Court also ruled that the Defendants could re-
cover from the Third Party Defendants for the loss of the 
disputed property with the amount to be determined by 
the agreed price per acre at the time of the conveyance 
rather than at the time of the breach. The Court entered 
a similar award in favor of the Third Party Defendants 
and against the Fourth Party Defendant. 
The Court denied the claims for costs and attorney's 
fees sought by the Defendant against the Third Party De-
fendants. 
2 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the Trial 
Court reversed and title to the disputed property quieted 
i n k . 
Defendant also seeks to have the Judgment of the 
Trial Court reversed which denied its claim for costs and 
attorney's fees against the Third Party Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves a dispute between Plaintiffs 
and Defendant concerning the ownership of a parcel of 
land located in Garfield County, State of Utah. The fol-
lowing diagram shows the property in question and the 
disputed area is designated by the diagonal lines. 
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Prior to 1957 all of tracts 1, 2 and 3 were owned by 
the Fourth Party Defendant Delia D. Marsden and her 
husband William Marsden who had acquired the prop-
erty from Mr. Marsden's father. (R. 297) However, on 
November 1, 1957 William Marsden deeded tract 3 which 
includes the disputed area to his wife, the Fourth Party 
Defendant, Delia D. Marsden, along with other prop-
erty. A certified copy of the Deed is at R. 122, and re-
ferred to in Finding of Fact No. 3 at R. 92. 
On the 2nd day of September, 1958, the Fourth Party 
Defendant Delia D. Marsden entered into a contract with 
Plaintiffs to sell them the property referred to as tract 1. 
(Exhibit 15, R. 251) On the same date a Warranty Deed 
was executed and delivered from Fourth Party Defend-
ant to Plaintiffs conveying to them the property referred 
to as tract 1 which was described in the Deed as the North-
east quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, T35 S, 
R 7 W, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (Exhibit 16, R. 
254, 255) 
During the month of August, 1958 the Plaintiff Fred 
N. Hobson and William Marsden met in the area between 
tracts 1 and 2 along with a Mr. Ralph Reynolds, an em-
ployee of Plaintiffs. (R. 140, 141) William Marsden, 
through the use of a hand held compass purported to show 
Plaintiff and his employee where the West boundary line 
of tract 1 was located. Stakes were driven along the pur-
ported boundary line by Mr. Reynolds at the direction of 
Mr. Marsden. Mr. Marsden also purported to show him 
a pile of rocks which he indicated was the Northwest 
corner of tract 1. (R. 149) Mr. Hobson concedes that 
4 
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there was no dispute between he and William Marsden as 
to where the boundary line was at the time the stakes were 
driven. (R. 199) 
It is significant to note that the record does not con-
tain,,, any evidence that William D. Marsden was acting 
as the agent of his wife, the Fourth Party Defendant Delia 
D. Marsden,, at the time he met with Plaintiff Fred N. 
Hobson and purported, to advise him of the location of 
the boundary line nor was any finding of fact to this effect 
made by the Court. 
Following the meeting on t i l l . * ' * • '- i »\ C C l i 
Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson and William I\i..:bUi:n, a lence 
was constructed along the line in 1958. (R. 248) This 
fence line extended beyond the legal description of tract 
1 and encroached onto tract 3 as shown in die diagram. 
In the year 1964 Delia I>. /uarMien ^oi^wved die 
property referred to in the diagram as traci > to the Third 
Party Defendants. (R. 350) Thereafter, on September 15, 
1965 the Third Pari) Defendant', convened the same 
property to the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. 
(R. 351, Exhibit 20) 
In the spring of 1968 the Defendant Panguitch Lake 
Corporation, after having the property line surveyed, de-
termined that the fence erected, by the Plaintiffs encroach-
ed upon their property and had the same removed. (R. 
353,, 354) 
During the summer of 1968 a meeting occurred at the 
disputed property line and those present included the 
Plaintiff Fred N, Hobson, two representatives of Pan-
' • ) 
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guitch Lake Corporation, Oliver D. LeFevre and David 
Watson. (R. 356) Also present at the meeting was Bruce 
Whited, a licensed surveyor who had been retained by 
the Plaintiffs to survey the property for them in June of 
1968. (R. 331) Mr. Whited had determined that the bound-
ary line in the Deed from Delia D. Marsden to the Plain-
tiffs was considerably to the East of the fence line which 
they had erected in 1958. (R. 332) He was also aware that 
Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation had had a survey 
made to establish the correct boundary line. (R. 332) 
There was a slight variance between the two surveys 
which would have resulted in a discrepancy at the South-
west corner of approximately ten (10) feet and Mr. Whited 
advised Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson and Oliver D. LeFevre 
of Panguitch Lake Corporation of this variance. (R. 333) 
Upon the suggestion of Mr. Whited, the Plaintiff 
Fred N. Hobson and Oliver D. LeFevre of Defendant 
Panguitch Lake Corporation agreed that the correct line 
should be established between the two surveys and the 
line was staked. (R. 334, 335; R. 261; R. 319, 320; R. 
343, 344; R. 359, 360; R. 372) A fence was constructed 
along the new line by Defendant Panguitch Lake Corpo-
ration who has had possession of the property since that 
date. (R. 188) 
At the conclusion of the trial the parties stipulated 
that the matter be submitted to the Court on written 
briefs and the Plaintiffs' brief was due on January 15, 
1972 with the Defendants to file their briefs within 25 
days thereafter. No brief was filed by the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants have never been firmly apprised of the 
6 
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| e g a l theory or theories upon which Plaintiffs ck-aw atle 
to the property in question. Thereafter, on December 19, 
1972 a Decision was rendered with Findings of I act, 
Conclusions of Law" and a Judgment and Decree signed 
by the Court on December 29, 1972. (R. 91, 9S) 
ARGUMENT 
POIN1 T 
THE TITLE TO IRACTS i AND 3 WAS 
VESTED IN DELLA D. MARSDEN AT THE 
TIME PLAINTIFFS PURCHASED THEIR IN-
TEREST IN TRACT I 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, on November 
1, 1957, William Marsden executed a Warranty Deed 
conveying title to tracts 1 and 3 to his wife Delia D. Mars-
den which Deed was recorded on July 26, 1958. Finding 
of Fact No. 3 provides in part as follows: 
"That William Marsden executed a Warranty 
Deed which was recorded on July 30, 1958 in Book 
111 at Page 569 of the Garfield County Records 
conveying to Delia D. Marsden, the wife of the 
grantor, the above described property. That prior 
to the date of said conveyance William Marsden 
had entered into an agreement for conveyance to 
Plaintiffs, Fred N. Hobson and Mary L. Hobson, 
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship 
and not as tenants in common, the Northeast 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 
31. " [Emphasis added} 
The emphasized portion of the foregoing Finding is con-
trary to the testimony of Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson con-
cerning this transaction. Mr. Hobson stated as follows: 
/ 
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"Q — When did you buy it? 
A — I believe it was in 1958, in approximately 
August, the first 40, and then maybe a 
couple of weeks later the second 40. . . ." 
(R. 236, 237) 
This date is further corroborated by the Sales Agreement 
dated September 2, 1958 (Exhibit 15) whereby Delia D. 
Marsden, who owned the property at that time, agreed to 
sell tract 1 to the Plaintiffs. 
The record is completely void of any evidence which 
would establish an agreement between Plaintiffs and 
William D. Marsden to purchase tract 1 prior to the date 
of the Sales Agreement, September 2, 1958. Further, any 
such purported agreement or finding of the same would 
be contrary to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, 
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, which provides as 
follows: 
"Estate or interest in real property. — No estate 
or interest in real property, other than leases for a 
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than 
by act or operation of law, or by deed or convey-
ance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authori2ed 
by writing." 
As can be seen by the foregoing, it is clear that at the 
time the Plaintiffs purchased their interest in tract 1, both 
it and tract 3 were owned by the Fourth Party Defendant, 
Delia D. Marsden. As a consequence of this, any oral 
8 
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agreement between Plaintiffs and William D. Marsden 
purporting to establish a boundary line between tracts 1 
and 3 would be ineffective as no evidence was introduced 
or finding made to the effect that William D. Marsden 
was the agent of the property owner Delia D. Marsden 
with the authority to enter into such a transaction. 
POINT II 
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
SHOULD BE QUIETED IN DEFENDANT 
PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION. 
A—THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM TO TITLE TO 
THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE ESTABLISH-
ED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
In order for a person to establish title to real property 
by adverse possession one must maintain open, notorious, 
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the prop-
erty for a period of seven (7) years. See Cooper v. Carter 
Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320. 
In addition to the foregoing requirements, the claim-
ant must have paid the taxes which have been levied on 
the property pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-12-
12, Utah Code Annotated which provides as follows: 
"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.— 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of 
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land ac-
cording to law." 
9 
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The Plaintiffs offered no evidence that they had paid 
real property taxes on the disputed property and no find-
ing of fact that such taxes had been paid by them was made 
by the Court. To the contrary, there was evidence that 
the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation had paid the 
taxes on the disputed property. (R. 361) 
B—THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF TITLE TO 
THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE ESTABLISH-
ED BY THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
For the purpose of this argument only, the Defend-
ant Panguitch Lake Corporation will concede that Wil-
liam D. Marsden was the agent of and had the authority 
from the Fourth Party Defendant Delia D. Marsden to 
agree with the Plaintiffs as to the location of the bound-
ary line. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has set forth 
the requirements necessary in order for a person to estab-
lish title to a disputed area of property based upon the doc-
trine by acquiescence. In the case of Fuoco v. Williams, 
18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944, the Court stated as follows: 
"In former opinions this Court has required four 
prerequisites to establish a presumption of bound-
ary by acquiescence. They are: (1) occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as 
the boundary, (3) for a long period of years, (4) 
by adjoining land owners." 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, in 1958 the 
construction of a fence was commenced by the Plaintiffs 
10 
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along the boundary line claimed by them pursuant to 
the agreement with William D. Marsden which was en-
tered into in August of 1958. This fence line remained in 
existence until it was removed by Defendant Panguitch 
Lake Corporation in 1968. (R. 354) In 1968 the Defend-
ant Panguitch Lake Corporation constructed a fence along 
the correct line as established by the surveyors and agreed 
to by the adjoining land owners. (R. 360) 
Thus, the critical question for determination is wheth-
er the Plaintiffs' possession of the disputed property for 
a period of ten (10) years is sufficient to comply with the 
requirement that the boundary line be observed for a 
"long period of years." 
In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 
P.2d 893, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah dis-
cussed the question of what length of time was necessary 
to satisfy this requirement and stated as follows: 
"Boiled down, it seems to us that establishment of 
boundary by acquiescence may be predicated upon 
the existence of a visible monumented line per-
sisting for at least 20 years or upwards, shown 
specifically or circumstantially in order to meet 
or exceed the requirements of acquiring rights by 
prescription. . . . " 
The Court also indicated that it felt the seven (7) year 
period called for in title by adverse possession was not 
sufficient and stated as follows: 
"In practically all of the cases, it appears that more 
than 20 years has been the yardstick. In one case, 
dictum-wise, Mr. Justice Wolfe suggested that the 
adverse possession statute calling for 7 years condi-
11 
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tional enjoyment should be the hallmark for 
boundary by acquiescence cases. This period is un-
realistic. It fails to recognize that under the ad-
verse possession statute, — strictly a limitations of 
action statute, one must have paid taxes, improved 
the property and the like and claimed it continu-
ously for 7 years. To assert that a 7-year persistent 
fence, nothing more, could ripen into title, is to 
overlook the following: (1) that it would establish 
title in the fencemaker, (2) without his having com-
plied with the sanctions of the adverse possession 
statute, which does not give title but only a de-
fense against others who claim it." 
As it was pointed out in the King case, supra, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not clearly estab-
lished what length of time is necessary to have the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence become applicable. However, 
all cases, both before and since the decision, wherein the 
doctrine has been found to be applicable, have involved 
periods of 20 years or more. See Johnson v. Sessions, 25 
Utah 2d 133, 477 P.2d 778 (21 years); Motzkus v. Car-
roll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391 (45 years); Willie v. 
Local Realty Company, 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (59 
years); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 105 (50 
years); Kanus v. Smith, 20 Utah 2d 444, 354 P.2d 124 
(20 years); Johnson Real Estate Company v. Nielson, 10 
Utah 2d 380, 353 P.2d 918 (25 years); Provonsha v. Pit-
man, 6 Utah 2d 6, 305 P.2d 486 (58 years). A period of 
nine (9) years was held to be insufficient in the case of 
Brien v. Smith, 100 Utah 213, 112 P.2d 145. 
In oral argument presented to the Court at the time 
of the hearing of a Motion for a Judgment on the Plead-
ings, the Plaintiffs' attorney indicated that they re-
12 
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lied upon the following language from the case of Brown 
v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202, in support of their 
claim of title to the disputed property. The Court stated as 
follows: 
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary 
disputes reveals that it has long been recognized in 
this State that when the location of the true bound-
ary between two adjoining tracts of land is un-
known, uncertain or in dispute, the owners there-
of may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary 
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and 
their grantees." 
The Plaintiffs' contention being that at the time of 
the meeting between Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson and Wil-
liam Marsden in August of 1958, the boundary line was 
orally established by them and no requirement of acquies-
cence in the same for a "long period of years" need be 
shown. 
However, from a reading of the Brown case, it is 
apparent that the Court in using the foregoing language 
was discussing the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
and that the quoted language must be read in context. In 
outlining the issues presented by the case, the Court 
stated at the outset as follows: 
". . . The appellant claims title to the land in 
dispute under a deed while the respondent claims 
title under the doctrine of boundary by acquies-
cence and by adverse possession. . . ." 
In further discussing the doctrine the Court stated as 
follows: 
"We have further held in this state that in the ab-
sence of evidence that the owners of adjoining 
property or their predecessors in interest ever ex-
13 
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pressly agreed as to the location of the boundary 
between them, if they have occupied their respec-
tive premises up to an open boundary line visibly 
marked by monuments, fences or buildings for a 
long period of time and mutually recognized it as 
the dividing line between them, the law will imply 
an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it 
can do so consistently with the facts appearing, and 
will not permit the parties nor their grantees to de-
part from such line. Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 
269, 87 P. 1009. This rule is sometimes referred to 
as the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. . • " 
[Emphasis added} 
The Brown case was cited with approval in the case of 
Blanchard v. Smith, 123 Utah 119, 225 P.2d 729, which 
held that even though an oral agreement between adjacent 
property owners can fix a boundary line, it must be 
acquiesced in for long period of years. In addressing it-
self to this question, the Court stated in part as follows: 
"We repeatedly have held that neighbors, by oral 
agreement may establish a common boundary 
which, after sufficiently long acquiescence, cannot 
be established. . . . " 
Also, in the case of Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 
437 P.2d 453, Justice Callister, in a concurring opinion, 
discusses the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and 
states as follows: 
"This doctrine is premised on either an express 
parol agreement by adjoining owners fixing the 
boundary or the court will imply such an agree-
ment by indulging 'in a fiction that at some time in 
the past the adjoining owners were in dispute or 
uncertain as to the location of the true boundary 
and that they settled their differences by agreeing 
14 
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upon the fence or other monument as the dividing 
line between their properties.' [Emphasis added} 
. . . The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
cannot be utilized as a subterfuge to avoid compli-
ance with the statutory provisions for adverse pos-
session" [Emphasis added} 
The "long period of years" rule is obviously designed 
to insure that people dealing with either adjacent land 
owner may be placed on notice of any discrepancy in the 
boundary line as contrasted to the legal description by 
physically observing a long established fence line or other 
monuments obviously separating the properties. To allow 
adjoining land owners to orally establish the boundary 
line between the tracts without the long acquiescence re-
quired by the doctrine, would lead to uncertainty and 
much controversy when questions arose concerning the 
location of the boundary line. 
A further ground upon which Plaintiffs' claim of 
title to the property based upon the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence must fail is the requirement that there 
must be a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of the 
boundary line between the adjacent owners prior to the 
establishment of the permanent boundary and that if it is 
marked by mutual mistake, it may be corrected. The latter 
part of this was referred to by the Court in the Blanchard 
case, supra, and the Court quoted with approval from 8 
Am. Jur. 2d, Boundaries, Section 77, p. 801, which pro-
vides as follows: 
"If, however, the parties undertake by a parol 
agreement to fix the location of a boundary line 
under the belief that they are fixing the true bound-
15 
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ary line, when in fact, it is not, their agreement is 
not binding and may be set aside by either party 
upon the discovery of the mistake. . . ." 
It is apparent that William Marsden and Plaintiff Fred 
N . Hobson, through a mistake, established a boundary 
line which did not conform to the actual boundary line 
between the two tracts in question and upon discovery 
of this mistake by Panguitch Lake Corporation in 1968, 
they were entitled to correct the same which was done. 
Also, in the case of Carter v. hinder, 23 Utah 2d 
204, 460 P.2d 830, the Court discussed the proposition 
that a dispute or uncertainty must exist between the adja-
cent land owners in order for the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence to be applicable. The Court stated as follows: 
". . . Without a dispute and uncertainty as to the 
true location of the boundary line there can be no 
boundary line by acquiescence under an oral agree-
ment between adjoining property owners. . . ." 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, the Plaintiff Fred 
N. Hobson testified that there was no dispute between 
himself and William Marsden as to the location of the 
boundary line and he was merely relying upon Mr. Mars-
den's hand-held surveying technique to establish the same. 
(R. 199, R. 237, 238) Further, there was no finding by the 
Court that such a dispute existed at the time of the meeting 
in August of 1958. 
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POINT III 
IN 1968 THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFEND-
ANT PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION 
ORALLY AGREED TO THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF A BOUNDARY BETWEEN 
TRACTS 1 AND 3. 
For the purpose of this agreement it must be assumed 
that adjacent land owners may, by oral agreement, estab-
lish a boundary line between the tracts without the re-
quirement that the same be marked and acquiesced in for 
a "long period of years," as contended by the Plaintiffs. 
On June 19, 1968 a meeting took place on the dis-
puted boundary line wherein the following persons, 
among others, were present: Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson, 
Oliver D. LeFevre on behalf of Defendant Panguitch Lake 
Corporation, David Bruce Whited, a surveyor hired by 
the Plaintiffs, Marvin Rice who purchased property in the 
disputed area from Plaintiffs, and David Watson, an em-
ployee of Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. At the 
time of this meeting, the fence line established by the 
Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson in 1958 had been removed and 
the correct boundary line had been located by a surveyor 
retained by Panguitch Lake Corporation and Mr. Whited 
who had surveyed the boundary line for the Plaintiffs. 
The following is the testimony of each of the persons 
present at the meeting concerning the conversation which 
took place as a result of the surveys: 
FRED N. HOBSON: 
"Q—Did you agree to assist Mr. LeFevre of the 
Panguitch Lake Corporation putting in the fence 
line in accordance with Mr. Whited's survey line? 
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A—If that can be proven that is correct, I would 
do anything fair. I said the line on the other side 
of the fence is mine. But I also said that the sur-
veyor, if he says that's the line, that's the line, but 
I didn't concede any land on either side of the line 
that I bought from William B. Marsden." (R. 261) 
MARVIN RICE: 
"Q—Tell me what was said by each party. 
A—Well, I don't really recall Mr. LeFevre saying 
anything. Mr. Hobson said, 'Well, if this is the 
fence line, this is it,' and he says, 'I want a very 
good fence put up,' he stressed this very much, he 
said he wanted a good fence put up and that he 
would pay half of the cost and half of the help in 
assembling the fence on this line. 
Q—Did he say where the fence was to go? 
A—On this survey line. 
Q—That is on this Whited survey line? 
A—On the Whiting survey line. {Whited] 
Q — w a s anything further said at that time by 
either of these parties about this disputed bound-
ary line? 
A—Well, I know him and Mr. LeFevre shook 
hands and said there would be no hard feelings." 
(R. 319, 320) 
DAVID BRUCE WHITED: 
"Q—Regardless of what the line was, they were 
talking about the construction of another fence; is 
that correct? 
A—Mr. Hobson said if the fence had to be moved, 
he'd help build it. 
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MR. CHAMBERLAIN: If the fence had to be 
moved; is that right? 
A—The reason for the—the reason that the agree-
ment on the line was, is that there was enough 
discrepancy in the two surveys that if I continued 
on my survey, it would be meaningless in order to 
tie down the location of the fence, so I went to 
Mr. Hobson and I went to Mr. LeFevre and I said, 
'Now, this is where Mr. Plat puts the property 
line?' And I said, 'This is where I put i t / and I 
said, ' 'there's enough discrepancy that if I con-
tinue on this, I'm going to be some eight or ten 
feet off,' even though the point we were looking at 
we were within 18 inches. It was 18 inches where 
we were looking at it, and it was approximately a 
foot or less than a foot at the corner. So in order 
to establish the location of that line, I was going 
to survey and make my further ties, then I got 
them to agree on it and then I drove the stake in 
the middle and then continued on with the sur-
vey." (R. 343, 344) 
MR. LE FEVRE: 
"Q—So Mr. Whited, who was Mr. Hobson's sur-
veyor, was better for you than was your own; is 
that correct? 
A—In this particular point where the transit is 
set up. 
Q—Okeh, Go ahead. 
A—And he says, 'What can we do / and I said, 
'Let's split the difference.' 
THE COURT: Who was that? 
A—Mr. Fred Hobson. He said, 'What can we do,' 
and I said, 'Let's split the difference.' 
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Q—What did he say to that? 
A—And he was agreeable to this. 
Q—Was anything further said about the establish-
ment? 
A— . . . and Fred said, T will send a man to help 
you put this new fence according to the new line 
we established/ and then he mentioned something 
to Mr. Rice about, 'You will have to move these 
other lots back' or something, that were in ques-
tion/ ' (R. 359, 360) 
MR. WATSON: 
The parties stipulated that if Mr. Watson were 
called to testify, his testimony would be the same 
as that of Mr. LeFevre concerning the meeting in 
question. (R. 372) 
As can be seen by the foregoing, it is apparent that a 
meeting did take place on June 19, 1968 wherein the 
parties agreed to establish the disputed boundary line be-
tween tracts 1 and 3 based upon the surveys performed for 
the parties and further agreed to construct a fence along 
this line. The fence was constructed immediately follow-
ing this meeting by Defendant Panguitch Lake Corpora-
tion who has had possession of the disputed property since 
that date. (R. 360) Finding of Fact No. 10 states, in effect, 
that any conduct on the part of Plaintiffs subequent to the 
meeting with William D. Marsden in 1958 did not consti-
tute a reconveyance or relocation of the line established 
at that time. This so called finding is in reality a con-
clusion of law which is not supported by applicable legal 
principles and the facts upon which it is purportedly based 
and which have been set forth above clearly would not 
support the same. 
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Thus, if in fact the boundary line was established by 
the meeting between William Marsden and Plaintiffs in 
August of 1958, it was relocated by the meeting of June 
19, 1968 and title to the disputed property should be 
quieted in Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT PANGUITCH LAKE CORPO-
RATION IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAM-
AGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS. 
The trial of the case which was held on November 
5 and December 15, 1971 was limited to the issues con-
cerning the location of the boundary line in dispute. (R. 
85, 135) Notwithstanding this, at the time the Decision 
was rendered by the Court, the same denied the claim of 
the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation for damages 
and attorney's fees against the Third Party Defendants for 
breach of the covenants contained in the Warranty Deed. 
(R.97) 
Thereafter, the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corpo-
ration made a Motion to amend the Findings of Fact and 
Judgment and to make additional Findings of Fact pur-
suant to the provisions of Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. pp. 99-102) This Motion 
was heard by the Court and on December 13, 1973 an 
Order was entered which provided in part as follows: 
". . . {T}he court holds that the reduction in pur-
chase price shall be determined by the agreed price 
per acre paid by Panguitch Lake Corporation as 
per agreement of September 15, 1965. 
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The costs and attorney's fees sought by the Third 
Party Defendants are denied." 
By the Warranty Deed dated September 15, 1965, 
the Third Party Defendants conveyed title to the prop-
erty in question, including the disputed area, to the De-
fendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. (Exhibit 20) The 
law of the State of Utah is to the effect that if a grantor 
conveys legal title to property to a grantee by Warranty 
Deed and title in the grantee is challenged or found to be 
defective, the grantee is entitled to recover from the 
grantor damages for the breach which include compensa-
tion for any property lost and costs and attorney's fees in-
curred in connection with the defense of the title. In this 
regard, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the 
case of Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 
403, stated as follows: 
". . . The majority rule, with which we are in 
accord, is that there is a breach of warranty when 
it is shown that the grantor did not own the land 
that he purported to convey by the warranty deed 
description. The covenants involved are of seizin 
and of good right to convey the property, which 
for the purposes considered in this case, are synony-
mous; and the breach thereof is made out by a 
showing that those rights did not exist in the 
grantor, and it is not necessary to show an actual 
eviction or threat thereof. However, even though 
the grantee is entitled to the peaceable possession 
and enjoyment of the property he purchases in 
accordance with the warrants, he is entitled only to 
the damage he suffers as a result of the breach 
thereof, but this includes taking such measures as 
are reasonable and necessary to clear up any diffi-
culty which would represent a substantial flaw in 
his title. 
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. . . As above noted, inasmuch as it is shown that 
there was a technical defect in the title, the plain-
tiffs would be justified in doing whatever was rea-
sonable and prudent to clear it up; and if this in-
volved the necessity of employing an attorney, the 
reasonable expense therefor would be compensa-
ble. . . ." 
Other cases setting forth this proposition are: VanCott v. 
Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 266 P. 460 and Lowe Co. v. Sim-
mons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 359, 117 P. 874. 
In accordance with the legal principles set forth 
above, the Defendant is entitled to recover reasonable at-
torney's fees and costs in connection with the defense of 
the title from Third Party Defendants and if the title to 
the property is quieted in the Plaintiffs, it is also entitled 
to recover damages from Third Party Defendants as a re-
sult of the loss of the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that at the time 
the boundary claimed by the Plaintiffs was purportedly 
established, the person with whom they dealt, to-wit: Wil-
liam Marsden, had no ownership interest in the property 
and no authority from the true owner to enter into such an 
agreement. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to pay taxes on the dis-
puted property and, thus, may not claim title to the same 
by adverse possession. The possession of the property by 
the Plaintiff for a period of ten (10) years is an insuffi-
cient length of time to comply with the requirement that 
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the same be held for a "long period of years/ ' Further, 
there was no dispute concerning the boundary line pur-
portedly established and the same was located by a mutual 
mistake and may be set aside. 
If the oral agreement purporting to establish the 
boundary line in 1965 is held to be sufficient, the oral 
agreement re-establishing the same in 1968 is likewise 
sufficient and title to the property should be quieted in 
Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. 
As a result of the breach of the covenants contained 
in the Warranty Deed, the Defendant Panguitch Lake 
Corporation is entitled to recover attorney's fees in con-
nection with the defense of the title and damages for the 
loss of the property in the event title to the same is quieted 
in Plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ANTHONY EYRE 
Kipp and Christian 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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